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Abstract Autism is characterised by a range of perceptual
and sensorimotor deficits, which might be related to
abnormalities in how autistic individuals use prior knowl-
edge. We investigated this proposition in a large non-clin-
ical population in the context of the size-weight illusion,
where individual’s expectations about object weight influ-
ence their perceptions of heaviness and fingertip forces.
Although there was no relationship between autistic traits
and the magnitude of the illusion, we observed an inverse
relationship between AQ scores and how expectations
influenced initial fingertip force application. These findings
provide a novel dissociation between how perceptual and
sensorimotor processes are related to autistic traits, and
suggest that, autistic traits might explain some of the vari-
ance surrounding how individuals grip and lift objects.
Keywords Autistic quotient  Grip force  Object lifting 
Size-weight illusion  Sensorimotor prediction
Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a highly heritable and
heterogeneous neurodevelopmental disorder. It is charac-
terised by a variety of symptoms including language
impairments, stereotyped behavioural patterns, and social
difficulties (for recent review, see Jones et al. 2014). Cur-
rently, diagnosis is based upon a dyad of social interaction
and communication skills, in addition to a restricted
repertoire of interests and behaviours (DSM-V, APA, 2013).
In recent years, high-level explanatory theories of ASD have
moved from single deficit to multiple deficit accounts (see
Rajendran and Mitchell 2007 for a review of the cognitive
theories). In addition to differences at these high levels of
cognition, an increasing body of work has indicated that
ASD populations might exhibit atypical perception and
deficits in sensorimotor control—a point acknowledged in
the revised DSM-V criteria for ASD (DSM-V, APA 2013).
In terms of sensorimotor control, a range of studies have
found evidence for movement deficits in populations with
autism (for review, see Gowen and Hamilton 2013). A
growing body of work suggests that the locus of many of
these movement problems might stem from difficulties in
utilizing prior information to guide feedforward control
mechanisms. For example, Schmitz et al. (2003) compared
postural responses of children with and without autism in a
task where a mass they were holding was removed. Chil-
dren without autism showed clear anticipatory postural
adjustments, indicating that they were anticipating the
removal of the load. Children with autism, by contrast,
showed a much later postural response to having the load
removed, suggesting that they were utilizing an online,
feedback-driven control strategy in this task (see also
Mosconi et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2014).
Although rarely considered as having specific perceptual
impairments, a well-established body of work has demon-
strated that ASD populations show atypical performance on
a wide range of perceptual tasks. Most notably, studies have
shown that ASD populations outperform matched control
samples on embedded figure tasks and local versus global
processing (Mitchell and Ropar 2004; Shah and Frith 1983).
Interestingly, several studies have shown that ASD popula-
tions might be less affected by visual illusions which are
based on an individual’s prior knowledge. Ropar and
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Mitchell (2002) examined the well-established perceptual
bias to judge a slanted circle as appearing more circular than
it actually is. This effect is typically taken to reflect ‘shape
constancy’—the implicit integration of the prior knowledge
that the shape is a circle with the input on the retina. The
authors noted that ASD individuals were far less affected by
their prior knowledge in conditions where other visual cues
were removed, reporting the true shape of the slanted circle
more accurately than control participants. Recently, Mitchell
et al. (2010) have found a similar effect for the Shepard
illusion, where the top surfaces of two identical, but dif-
ferently-oriented, table surfaces appear to have markedly
different aspect ratios from one another. This effect is typ-
ically understood as reflecting how individuals’ prior
knowledge of depth cues, and their implicit assumption that
tables have depth, influences their perception. The smaller
illusory effect experienced by ASD individuals suggests that
their conscious perception is not biased by prior knowledge
as much as non-clinical populations.
Due to the heterogeneous nature of ASD, its many co-
morbid disorders, and the difficulty these populations have
with providing verbal reports, it has often been difficult to
draw strong conclusions about the relationship between
autism and perceptual/sensorimotor abnormalities. In
recent years, to capitalise on the spectrum nature of the
disorder, efforts have been made to classify non-clinical
populations in terms of their autistic spectrum character-
istics. The most popular of these scales, the Autism
Spectrum Quotient (AQ), was developed by Baron-Cohen
et al. (2001), and has been validated in a range of non-
clinical contexts (e.g., Ruzich et al. 2015). This approach
has already been successfully employed in a range of
contexts (e.g., McKenna et al. 2015; Sutherland and
Crewther 2010). Of particular relevance to the current
work, Chouinard et al. (2013) examined the relationship
between autistic traits and individuals’ susceptibility to
three widely-studied visual illusions: the Mu¨ller-Lyer
illusion, the Ponzo illusion, and the Ebbinghaus illusion.
They reported an inverse correlation between AQ scores
and the magnitude of the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion (i.e., indi-
viduals with higher AQ scores experienced a less powerful
illusion), but found no relationship between autistic traits
and the magnitude of the Ponzo or Ebbinghaus illusions.
Although the role of prior knowledge in visual illusions has
been well studied in ASD and its broader phenotype, no study
has examined how autistic traits are reflected in perception and
action within the same task. To this end, we examined fingertip
force control and perceptions of heaviness in the context of the
‘Size-Weight Illusion’ (SWI), where prior knowledge influ-
ences perception and action in unique and dissociable ways. A
large non-clinical sample of individuals lifted objects which
induced the SWI, where small objects are judged as feeling
heavier than larger objects of the same mass (Charpentier
1891). Typically, this illusion is taken to reflect how prior
expectations, for example that large objects are likely to be
heavier than small objects, are integrated with sensory input to
form the conscious experience of the smaller objects feeling
heavier than the larger objects (Buckingham 2014; Bucking-
ham and Goodale 2010a; Flanagan et al. 2008). In contrast to
the majority of other integration effects in perception (e.g.,
Ernst and Banks 2002), the experience of an object’s heaviness
reflects the inverse of the standard Bayesian optimal integration
between priors and sensory input (Brayanov and Smith
2010)—the objects which the lifter expects to feel light end up
feeling heavier than they actually are, especially in comparison
to heavier-looking counterparts of the same mass.
In the context of object lifting, prior expectations do not
only influence perceptions of heaviness. Because of the feed-
forward, predictive, nature of how we grip and lift objects, the
apparent heaviness of an object also influences the forces used
to lift it. Therefore, novel heavy-looking objects are lifted with
more force than novel light-looking objects—regardless of how
much they actually weigh (Gordon et al. 1992). Thus, when
interacting with objects which induce the SWI, individuals tend
to lift the large (heavy-looking) object with more force than the
small (light-looking) object. Interestingly these sensorimotor
prediction ‘errors’ do not persist and, in stark contrast to the
static and unchanging perceptual illusion, individuals rapidly
adapt their fingertip force rates from the expected to the actual
(and identical) weights of the illusion-inducing objects
(Flanagan and Beltzner 2000). Thus, the level of gripping and
lifting forces used to lift an object is dissociated from how
heavy that object subsequently feels when its weight is judged
(see also Buckingham and Goodale 2010b, 2013; Grandy and
Westwood 2006).
To date, no study has systematically investigated what
drives individual differences in the magnitude of these
perceptual and sensorimotor effects in non-clinical popu-
lations. To this end, we examined how autistic traits were
related to the perception of object weight, sensorimotor
prediction, and fingertip force adaptation, in a classic SWI
experiment. If a high prevalence of autistic traits does
impact upon an individual’s ability to integrate prior
knowledge into their conscious perceptual experience, it is
likely that individuals with higher AQ scores will experi-
ence a reduced illusion in addition to making smaller size-
induced prediction errors when they lift the large and small
objects for the first time.
Methods
Participants
Eighty-five volunteers (37 female, mean age = 22.0 years,
SD = 3.6) took part in a simple object lifting study. The
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majority of participants (75) were self-reported right han-
ders. All procedures were approved by the ethics board at
Heriot-Watt University, and informed consent was
obtained from all individual participants included in the
study. All participants were university undergraduate stu-
dents or members of the surrounding community, and had
no reported sensorimotor deficits. In addition, none of the
participants has been formally diagnosed with autism.
Materials
Prior to undertaking the object lifting task, participants
completed a pencil-and-paper version of the adult Autistic
Quotient (AQ: Baron-Cohen et al. 2001; Woodbury-Smith
et al. 2005). The 50 item questionnaire contains self-
statements covering five domains associated with ASD:
communication and social skills, attention to detail, atten-
tion switching, imagination and rigidness of interests and
behaviour. Example statements include ‘‘I find it hard to
make new friends’’, ‘‘I tend to notice details that others do
not’’ and ‘‘It does not upset me when my daily routine is
disturbed’’. Each statement is responded to on a 4 point
Likert scale. This allows participants to indicate whether,
they ‘‘definitely agree’’, ‘‘slightly agree’’, ‘‘slightly dis-
agree’’ or ‘‘definitely disagree’’ with the statements. The
AQ is scored out of 50 points with higher scores reflecting
higher levels of autistic traits. Although the AQ was not
developed to be a diagnostic tool, a score of 26 or above
has been reported to be potentially indicative of Asperger
syndrome (Woodbury-Smith et al. 2005) and 32 or above
reported to be indicative of ‘‘clinically significant’’ levels
of autistic traits (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). In our sample,
AQ scores ranged from 2 to 32, and the mean AQ score
was 15.2 (SD = 5.7).
Participants lifted three homogenous black plastic
cylinders with a constant height (7.5-cm) and mass (400-g),
but varying diameters (Fig. 1a). The small cylinder had a
diameter of 5-cm, the medium cylinder had a diameter of
7.5-cm, and the large cylinder had a diameter of 10-cm.
Each cylinder had a mount attached to the centre of its top
surface, which facilitated the rapid attachment of an alu-
minium and plastic handle containing an ATI Nano-17
force transducer (Fig. 1b), which recorded forces in 3
dimensions at 1000 Hz. During the experiment, partici-
pants wore LCD PLATO shutter goggles (Translucent
Technologies) which occluded their vision in between lifts
of the objects.
Procedure and Analysis
After completing a pencil-and-paper version of the AQ,
participants undertook the experimental trials. On each
trial, participants were seated with their dominant hand
resting on the table in front of them, with the lenses of the
shutter goggles opaque. The experimenter then quietly
placed one of the cylinders directly in front the participant.
When the goggles opened, concurrent with an auditory cue,
participants reached out with their dominant hand, grasped
the handle attached to the top surface of the cylinder with
their thumb and index finger, and lifted the object in a
‘smooth, controlled, and confident manner’. They were
instructed to keep the object steady a few centimetres
above the table surface until a second auditory cue 4-s after
the start of the trial signalled them gently place the object
back on the table’s surface. Participants then gave a
numerical judgement about how heavy the object felt
during the lift. There were no constraints on this scale,
other than higher values would indicate a heavier-feeling
object and vice versa (i.e., an arbitrary magnitude estima-
tion—Zwislocki and Goodman 1980). Participants lifted
each of the three objects 10 times in one of three pseudo-
randomised orders, for a total of 30 lifts in a single session.
Including the time taken to complete the AQ, the entire
experiment lasted approximately 30 min.
The data extracted from the force transducers were
smoothed with a 14-Hz Butterworth filter. We defined the
forces perpendicular to the surface of the handle as grip
force and the vector sum of the remaining forces as load
force. These force profiles were differentiated with a
5-point central difference equation to yield their rates of
change. The peak value of the grip force rate (pGFR) and
load force rate (pLFR) on the initial lift of each cylinder
provided an index of sensorimotor prediction. The force
rates used to lift the small cylinder were subtracted from
the force rates used to lift the large cylinder on the first lifts
of these objects, to provide an index of how size cues
influence fingertip forces (pGFRdiff and pLFRdiff). The
heaviness ratings given on each trial by each participant
were normalized to a z-distribution, and the average value
given to each cylinder was taken to reflect their perceptions
of object weight. The magnitude of the SWI on a particular
trial was calculated as the rating given to the large cylinder
subtracted from the rating given to the small cylinder.
Results
Effect of Object Size on Perceptions of Heaviness
and Fingertip Force Application
Prior to our analyses, we excluded five participants as
outliers, due to the fact that they had a SWI which was
three standard deviations above or below the mean, or
exhibited an effect of object size on their force rates which
was three standard deviations above or below the mean.
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The remaining sample of 80 individuals showed clear
indications that their perceptions of heaviness across all
trials, and their fingertip forces on the first lift of each
object, were influenced by the size of the cylinders. When
examining average perceptions of heaviness with a one
way within-subject ANOVA, we observed a significant
main effect of object size (F(1,79) = 1147.9, p\ .001;
gp2 = .94). Post hoc t-tests confirmed that participants
experienced a robust SWI, reporting that small cylinder felt
heavier than medium-sized cylinder (t(78) = 29.5,
p\ .001) or the large cylinder (t(78) = 42.3, p\ .001),
with the large cylinder feeling less heavy than the medium-
sized cylinder (t(78) = 22.9, p\ .001).
Similarly, we found a significant main effect of object
size when examining the first-trial force rates for pGFR
(F(1,79) = 84.1, p\ .001; gp2 = .32) and pLFR
(F(1,79) = 48.8, p\ .001; gp2 = .26). Thus, on the first
lift of each object, participants lifted the large cylinder with
a higher rate force than the medium cylinder (pGFR:
t(78) = 4.0, p\ .001; pLFR: t(78) = 4.76, p\ .001) or
the small cylinder (pGFR: t(78) = 9.2, p\ .001; pLFR:
t(78) = 7.0, p\ .001), and lifted the small cylinder with
less force than the medium-sized cylinder (pGFR:
t(78) = 4.4, p\ .001; pLFR: t(78) = 2.8, p\ .01). In
short, our participants showed perceptual reporting
(Fig. 2a) and sensorimotor prediction (Fig. 2b, c) that is
consistent with numerous other studies using similar
stimuli (Buckingham et al. 2012; Buckingham and Goodale
2010b; Flanagan and Beltzner 2000).
Relationship Between Autistic Traits and Perception
and Action During SWI
To examine the relationship between autistic traits and the
factors outlined above, we calculated a simple metric of the
magnitude of the SWI across all trials by subtracting the
average reported weight of the light-feeling large object
from the average reported weight of the heavy-feeling
small object. We calculated an analogous metric to quan-
tify the magnitude of the effect of object size on the initial
fingertip force rates by subtracting the pGFR and pLFR
used to lift the small object from the pGFR and pLFR used
to lift the large object. This index of how object size
influences sensorimotor prediction is hereafter referred to
as pGFRdiff and pLFRdiff. For direct comparison to these
single-trial difference scores, we also calculated the mag-
nitude of the SWI on trial 1 alone. We then examined the
relationship between these metrics and individuals’ AQ
scores in three separate Pearson’s correlations. Counter to
our predictions, we observed no relationship between the
magnitude of the SWI and AQ scores (r = -0.04, n = 80,
p = .75; see Fig. 3a). Similarly, we observed no relation-
ship between AQ scores and the SWI on the first trial in
isolation (r = 0.13, n = 80, p = .27). There were, how-
ever, significant negative correlations between individuals’
AQ scores and pGFRdiff (r = -0.24 n = 80, p\ .05; see
Fig. 3b) as well as their pLFRdiff (r = -0.24, n = 80,
p\ .05; see Fig. 3c).
In order to determine whether the relationship between
the size effect on force rates and autistic traits may be
driven by other demographic variables which may be
correlated with AQ scores, we performed separate stepwise
linear regressions to explain the degree to which age,
handedness, and gender were associated with pGFRdiff
and pLFRdiff over and above individuals’ AQ scores. Of
all of these factors, the AQ scores explained the most
variance in both the pGFRdiff and pLFRdiff analyses
(R2 = .056, p\ .05 in both cases). No other variable
explained enough variance to be included in the final model
(all p values[.3).
We also examined the degree to which rates of fingertip
force adaptation (i.e., trial-by-trial learning) was related to
autistic traits. To this end, we calculated the unsigned
difference between the force rate used to lift each object on
the 2nd lift and the force rate used to lift each object on the
1st lift (see Fig. 2b, c). With this novel metric, higher
values would indicate higher rates of learning from one
trial to the next. Here, however, we found no significant
relationship between rates of learning and autistic traits in
terms of pGFR (large: r = .06, n = 80, p = .61; medium:
Fig. 1 a The small, medium, and large cylinders lifted by participants and b the handle they used to grip and lift the cylinders
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r = -.17, n = 80, p = .12; small: r = .010, n = 80,
p = .38) or pLFR (large: r = .-005, n = 80, p = 97;
medium: r = -.18, n = 80, p = .11; small: r = .20,
n = 80, p = .07). Thus, the relationship between action
parameters and autistic traits appears to be limited to initial
sensorimotor prediction, with no obvious effect on trial-by-
trial learning.
Discussion
This study examined if autistic traits influence the degree to
which prior expectations affect perception and action. To
this end, we measured the fingertip forces in a large non-
clinical population while they lifted and judged the weight
of objects which induce the SWI—cylinders which varied
Fig. 2 a The perceived heaviness ratings of each object across all trials, b the peak grip force rate (pGRF) applied to each object across all trials,
and c the peak load force rate (pLFR) used to lift each object across all trials. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean
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in volume, but had the same mass as one another. Our
sample, on average, experienced a robust SWI, reporting
that the small cylinder felt heavier than the medium-sized
cylinder, which they in turn judged as feeling heavier than
the large cylinder (Fig. 2a). The magnitude of this perpetual
illusion did not, however, have any relationship to AQ
scores in our sample (Fig. 3a), suggesting that the degree to
which prior knowledge influences an individual’s percep-
tion of object weight is unrelated to their autistic traits.
These findingsmay indicate that the SWI does not, in fact,
reflect how prior expectations are integrated into perceptual
reports, instead being a consequence of a perceptual
mechanism to detect variables other than object mass, such
as density (Chouinard et al. 2009; Grandy and Westwood
2006), inertia tensor (Amazeen and Turvey 1996), or
throwability (Zhu and Bingham 2011). However, given that
it has been directly shown that expectations contribute at
least partially to the experience of the SWI (Buckingham and
Goodale 2010a; Flanagan et al. 2008), we feel it more likely
that our results indicate that the ability to integrate past
perceptual experiences is not related to autism features in our
non-clinical sample. This finding is surprising given earlier
work showing that autistic populations, in contrast to non-
autistic controls, do not integrate prior knowledge about
objects into their visual experience of object shape (e.g.
Ropar andMitchell 2002). The results from the current work
suggest that autistic populations would experience just as
robust a SWI as other non-clinical populations—a conclu-
sion that is particularly surprising given recent findings
showing that ASD populations have a range of impairments
in their processing of tactile stimuli (Puts et al. 2014), and in
the integration of visual-tactile information (Poole et al.
2015a, b).
Our other main finding from this dataset was related to
the forces which participants used to lift the objects for the
first time. Our participants showed the classic pattern of
behaviour with these novel stimuli—lifting the large
cylinder with a higher rate of grip and load force than the
small cylinder on trial 1 (Fig. 2b, c). This behaviour is
typically taken to reflect an individual’s sensorimotor
expectations that large objects will outweigh small objects,
driven by the consistent positive correlation between size
and mass encountered in the real world (Gordon et al.
1991). Here—in contrast to our SWI data—we found an
inverse relationship between participants’ sensorimotor
expectations and their AQ scores (Fig. 3b, c), indicating
that individuals with more autistic traits are less inclined to
incorporate past information into their motor programmes
when interacting with novel objects. Follow-up regression
analyses confirmed that this relationship was not driven by
other correlated factors, such as participants’ gender. This
finding might represent a novel form of a motor deficit,
suggesting that individuals with ASD might make less
accurate/efficient sensorimotor predictions when interact-
ing with objects in the real world where, on average, pre-
dictive behaviour is likely to be advantageous. It is worth
noting that there we found no relationship between autistic
traits and the other fingertip force measure described in this
study—the rate of trial-to-trial learning, suggesting that this
an effect specific to the use of prior information, rather than
a generalized sensorimotor issue. These results are the first,
to our knowledge, to show an aspect of sensorimotor
control related to autistic traits in a non-clinical population,
highlighting the potential sensitivity of this measure. Our
findings are also in line with recent studies showing
Fig. 3 a Scatter plots highlighting the lack of relationship between
the magnitude of the SWI and AQ scores, b the significant
relationship between pGFRdiff and AQ scores, and c the significant
relationship between pLFRdiff and AQ scores
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reduced metrics of predictive control in different object
lifting paradigms in ASD populations (Mosconi et al. 2015;
Schmitz et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2014). It remains an open
question, however, about the degree to which other cues
that have been shown to influence sensorimotor prediction,
such as material cues and arbitrary learned associations
(Buckingham et al. 2009; Chouinard et al. 2005), are
related to autistic traits.
Our findings suggest that the sensorimotor aspects of the
ASD phenotype requires greater emphasis—both in
understanding ASD, but also in potentially providing an
endophenotype (Gottesman and Gould 2003; Iarocci et al.
2007) and/or a biomarker via the broader autism pheno-
type. The DSM-V (APA 2013) has re-highlighted the need
to understand the sensorimotor aspects of ASD. Indeed,
some have argued that ASD needs to be viewed in its
totality as both a perceptual-motor and social cognitive
disorder (McKenna et al. 2015; Mostofsky and Ewen 2011;
Rajendran and Mitchell 2007). As a counterpoint to the
dominance of the social-cognitive aspects of ASD, it may
be that some of the social-communication consequences of
ASD may be due to more primary differences in percep-
tion–action developmental. Indeed, Mostofsky and Ewen
(2011) argue that social and communicative competence
depends on the development of skilled behaviours and that
these skilled behaviours reside in the brain as internal
action models (Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi 1994). Con-
sequently, the autism phenotype may therefore arise from
the anomalous formation of internal action models, as has
been argued by Mostofsky and Ewen (2011) who propose
that internal action models are used in a ‘‘feedforward’’
fashion to extrapolate and understand the actions of others
for theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Klin et al.
2003).
Further, the exact mechanism of how ‘top-down’ (prior
knowledge) effects influences individuals with ASD, and
its broader phenotype, is as yet unknown. We consider our
findings in the context of the general autism phenotype,
which includes both individuals with ASD and those
without a clinical diagnosis. However, although we exer-
cise caution in extrapolating too far AQ results into clinical
samples (see also Gregory and Plaisted-Grant 2013), we
suggest that this research is a starting point to see if our
findings will not only be replicated in a clinical sample, but
also if the magnitude of these effects will be reflected in
differences that we might expect between a clinical sample
and an AQ sample. Future work will compare the current
measures of sensorimotor prediction between ASD and
control populations, to confirm (1) whether this effect is
more prevalent in clinical populations and (2) whether this
failure to integrate prior expectations might underpin the
widely-debated range of different sensorimotor deficits in
ASD individuals. This measure is particularly appealing as
a potential marker of ASD, not only in terms of sensori-
motor training, but also for the purposes of early diagnosis.
The object lifting task outlined in the current work is
simple to administer, and the influence of size cues on
sensorimotor prediction has been found in children as
young as 3 years of age (Gordon et al. 1992), suggesting it
is a robust behaviour which can be examined early in
development. Perhaps most importantly, the tendency to
lift heavy-looking objects with more force is a completely
implicit behaviour which does not rely on verbal reporting
or participant motivation – two factors which are difficult
to disentangle from traditional perceptual and sensorimotor
measures (Fisk and Goodale 1989; Raymond and O’Brien
2009).
To sum up, the current work examined how autistic
traits are related to perception and action in the context of
the size-weight illusion. In a large sample of neurotypical
individuals, we found no relationship between AQ scores
and the magnitude of the perceptual effect. We did, how-
ever, find a small, but significant, relationship between AQ
scores and sensorimotor prediction, both in terms of grip
and load force rates. These findings point towards a
potential dissociation of processes with perception unaf-
fected, but with action affected, by autistic traits. Future
work should examine this paradigm in clinically-diagnosed
ASD samples to determine the possible efficacy for this test
as a biomarker and endophenotype for ASD.
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